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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case
Plaintiff/Appellant Shawn Bailey ("Bailey") was the President and CEO of American

Medical File, Inc. ("AMF"), a now-bankrupt corporation. Bailey claims that
Defendant/Respondent Peritus Asset Management, LLC ("Peritus") -- one of many companies
that loaned money to AMF -- promised to pay the wages Bailey earned while working for AMF.
Bailey's Complaint initially alleged that Defendant Peritus personally guaranteed his wages.
However, Bailey has since admitted that there was no personal guarantee.
Bailey is distancing himself from the "personal guarantee" theory alleged in his
Complaint in an attempt to escape the statute of frauds. Nevertheless, Bailey still alleges that
Peritus promised to pay the wages Bailey earned while working for AMF. Such a claim falls
squarely within the statute of frauds, which bars evidence of an alleged promise to pay debts of
another absent a written memorandum identifying the debt, the primary obligor and a promise to
pay the primary obligor' s debt. The District Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor
of Peritus because Bailey cannot point to a written contract under which Peritus promised to pay
the wages Bailey earned while working for AMF.
B.

Statement Of Undisputed Factsl
1.

American Medical File, Inc.

1
This statement of undisputed facts is taken almost entirely from Bailey's deposition and
exhibits used during Bailey's deposition. It is essentially the same statement of undisputed facts
presented to the District Court, to which Bailey offered no objection. As Bailey recognized in
his Brief in Opposition to Defendant Peritus I Asset Management, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment, "[t]he underlying facts of this dispute are largely undisputed." See R. 000288.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1
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AMF was incorporated in the State of California on October 30, 2001, by

Anderson.

See R. 000011 at <J[ 9; R. 000176. AMF did business as "OnFile" and was known as both

"OnFile" and "American Medical File" and See R. 000073 (Bailey Depo., 21 :20-25). AMF was
in the business of providing medical records management software to hospitals, healthcare
providers, insurance companies and individuals in exchange for fees. See R. 000100-101,
000195-211 (BaileyDepo, 129:16-130:13,Exh.15).

2.

Peritus I Asset Management, LLC

Peritus, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, is an investment advisory company that
provides discretionary investment management services to investors. See R. 000010 at <JI 3.
Peritus advises clients on investment opportunities and is paid a fee for its advice and for
managing client investments. See R. 000224 at <JI 3.

3.

The Peritus Global Opportunity Fund

AMF operated from 2001 through 2004 under the direction of its original founders
without any involvement from Peritus. In 2004, a few of Peritus' clients became interested in
investing in AMF trough a separate legal entity. The Peritus Global Opportunity Fund Limited
Partnership (the "PGO Fund") -- a Delaware limited partnership entity operating as a "hedge
fund" -- was formed as a vehicle to invest in AMF and other opportunities. Numerous
individuals and entities invested in the PGO Fund. Id. Between September 2004 and November
2006, the PGO Fund invested $6.45 million in AMF in the form of secured promissory notes and
warrants. The PGO Fund also provided AMF with a bridge loan secured by the original AMF
founders' shares in AMF. When AMF defaulted on the bridge financing in 2005, the PGO Fund
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foreclosed on the security (the original founders' shares in AMF) and became the owner of the
majority of AMF's shares. Id. at <J[<J[ 4-5; R. 000086 (Bailey Depo. 73:4-20).

4.

AMF Hires Shawn Bailey under an "Oral Employment Contract"

In approximately April of 2006, Bailey was hired as "Vice President of Product
Development for AMF." See R. 000012 at <J[ 10. Bailey alleges that he was hired "under an oral
employment contract that was not put in writing and signed by the Defendants in order to
perpetuate a fraud against Bailey." Id. at <J[ 20. AMF paid Bailey a salary of $110,000 per year
and issued Bailey a W-2 every year reflecting his wages paid. See R. 000090 (Bailey Depa.,
89:11-90:18).

5.

Bailey Promoted to AMF CEO with Control over AMF's Bank Accounts and
Management of the Day to Day Operations of AMF

After working for AMF for approximately one year, the AMF Board of Directors voted
to promote Bailey to be the President and CEO of AMF, as set forth in the April 12, 2007
meeting minutes written by Bailey. See R. 000181-185. As the President and CEO of AMF,
Bailey ran the day-to-day operations of AMF and was one of just two signatories on AMF's bank
accounts. Id.; R. 000093 (Bailey Depo., 101:20 - 102: 13). On behalf of AMF, Bailey signed
contracts with customers and vendors and he filed corporate documents on behalf of AMF with
the California Secretary of State and Idaho Secretary of State. Id. at 102: 18-21; R. 000186-188.

6.

The PGO Fund Dissolves and Peritus Starts Making Bridge Loans

After investing millions of dollars in AMF through secured promissory notes, the PGO
Fund decided to stop investing in AMF and dissolved, effective December 31, 2008. See R.
000087 (Bailey Depo., 75: 12-25). Upon dissolving, the AMF shares held by the PGO fund were
distributed on a pro-rated basis to each of the investors in the then-dissolved PGO fund. Id.
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Like most start-up companies, American Medical File needed funding to pay its
operating expenses to supplement its limited customer revenues. That funding came from a
variety of sources. As set forth in the resume Bailey used to secure subsequent employment,
Bailey wrote business and marketing plans with investment bankers to raise over $2.3 million in
capital for AMF. See R. 000087, 000174-175 (Bailey Depo., 77:11-22, Exh. 3). Some of that
capital came in the form of stock purchases and other capital came in the form of loans. During
Bailey's tenure as President of AMF, approximately ten separate investors purchased AMF
shares in exchange for funds used to pay AMF' s operating expenses. Those stock grants, along
with all prior stock grants are reflected on AMF's stock ledger. See R. 000088, 000180 (Bailey
Depo., 78:2-16, Exh. 10). That stock ledger reflects over 40 separate shareholders who
contributed capital to AMF, along with a handful of key employees, including Bailey, who were
granted shares in AMF in exchange for their services. Id. Bailey used the stock ledger to show
the stock history of AMF to potential investors when he sought additional funding from
investors. Id.
In addition to capital contributions in the form of stock purchases, AMF received loans
from several sources. For example, the Inyo-Mono Title Company Profit Sharing plan ("InyoMono") loaned AMF $100,000 in in exchange for a promissory note signed by Bailey on behalf
of AMF. See R. 000212. Bailey also obtained on behalf of AMF a $10,000 loan from his own
father. See R. 000222. Between 2008 and 2011, Peritus provided loans to AMF in the amount
of approximately $800,000. See R. 000095, 000192-194 (Bailey Depo., 107:8-21, Exh. 14).
The loans from Peritus, Inyo-Mono, Bailey's father and others are not reflected on
AMF's stock ledger because they were loans, not stock purchases. As President of AMF, Bailey
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tracked those loans, which are reflected in financial reports prepared by AMF' s outside
accountant. See R. 000095 (Bailey Depo., 108:22-109:3). As set forth in Board of Director
minutes prepared by Bailey in 2009:
Shawn Bailey reported on the status of the current shareholder
registry and capital structure of the company. Shawn reported that
the capital structure [of] the company was made up of common
stock shareholders, long-term notes secured by warrants and only 2
unsecured notes ....
. . . .Attached, please find the updated loan calculations in interest
through December 31, 2009. Shawn also confirmed that all of this
information has been updated in a companies [sic] books and is
accurately reflected in all financial reports.
See R. 000189-191; R. 000229-252 (examples of AMF Financial statements and loan

calculations reflecting loans from Peritus and others).
The same minutes also reflect a decision by the AMF Board of Directors to increase
Bailey's compensation as CEO of AMF and grant him 1,500,000 shares in AMF Stock. See R.
000189-191. Bailey's 1,500,000 shares of AMF stock are listed in the stock ledger. See R.
0000180. The three other members of the AMF Board of Directors -- Ronald J. Heller
("Heller"), David J. Desmond ("Desmond") and William R. Espinosa ("Espinosa") -- each hold
1,500,000 shares in AMF as well. Id.

7.

The Written AMF Employment Agreement

Bailey alleges that he was not paid all compensation owed to him under his original "Oral
Employment Contract" and that, as of August 10, 2011, he was owed $95,000 in back wages.
See R. 000012 at Cjrlf 13-14. Bailey alleges that he threatened to quit in August of 2011 unless he

was given a written employment contract and a promise that his back wages would be paid in
full. Id. at <J{14. Accordingly, AMF provided Bailey with a "letter of employment with American
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Medical File, Inc. (OnFile)," which Bailey signed on October 10, 2011 (the "AMF Employment
Agreement"). See R. 000013, 000019-20. The AMF Employment Agreement outlines Bailey's
role as Chief Technology Officer of AMF and appoints Bailey as a "member of the Board of
Directors of American Medical File to which you and [the CEOl will provide regular reports."
Id. Finally, the AMF Employment Agreement provides for an annual salary of $150,000 and

confirms that Bailey had been awarded "1,500,000 shares of stock in American Medical File,
Inc." Id.
At the time of the AMF Employment Agreement, the AMF Board of Directors consisted
of four individuals: Heller, Desmond, Espinosa and Bailey. See R. 000099 (Bailey Depo., 122:217). The AMF Employment Agreement was signed by all three other members of the AMF
Board of Directors. See R. 000019-20. The signature lines for Desmond and Heller reference
their titles as members of the AMF Board of Directors and also note that they are Board
Members of Peritus I Asset Management, LLC. However, the body of the AMF Employment
Agreement does not state that Peritus was obligated to pay Bailey's salary or otherwise make a
single reference to Peritus. Id. In fact, Bailey admitted during his deposition that the AMF
Employment Agreement does not provide that Peritus would pay his salary. See R. 000098
(Bailey Depo., 119: 16-21). All wages paid to Bailey came in the form of a check from AMF.
Id. at89:11-18.

8.

Bailey's Resignation

Bailey stopped coming to work on March 17, 2013, and resigned shortly thereafter. See
R. 000104 (Bailey Depo., 143:8 - 144: 15); R. 000163 (Answer to Interrogatory No. 15). Bailey

did not give 30 days' notice of his resignation as required by the AMF Employment Agreement
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to entitle him to any severance. See

000104 (Bailey Depo., 144: 1 15); R. 000019-20. AMF

asked Bailey to work for an additional 30 days, but Bailey refused. Id. at 144:4-15. AMF issued
Bailey his final paycheck on March 27, 2013. See R. 000214.

9.

Bailey Demand Letters Sent to AMF Only

A few days after resigning, Bailey hired an attorney, R. Wade Curtis, who sent a demand
letter to AMF asserting that "American Medical File, Inc., aka 'OnFile,' has failed and refused to
pay Shawn his by-monthly salary over the past many months .... " See R. 000215-218. The letter
demanded that AMF pay Bailey $129,545.75 in back wages and $300,000 in severance pay. The
letter was sent to AMF only -- not Peritus -- and makes no mention of Peritus whatsoever. Id.
A few months later, Bailey hired a second law firm, Parsons Behle & Latimer, to
represent him in his claims against AMF. That law firm sent a second demand letter to AMF
only, which similarly asserted that "American Medical File, Inc., d/b/a 'OnFile' ... owes Mr.
Bailey approximately $130,000 (gross) in unpaid wages and $300,000 in severance pay." See R.
000219-220. Again, no mention was made of Peritus. Id.

C.

Course Of Proceedings Below
1.

The Complaint

Bailey filed his Complaint on October 30, 2014, asserting a "Breach of Employment
Contract" cause of action claiming that Bailey is owed $129,549.75 in wages and $300,000 in
severance. See R. 000009-20. Bailey's Breach of Employment Contract action is asserted not
only against AMF, but also against Peritus and the three other members of AMF's Board of
Directors -- Heller, Desmond and Espinosa. In support of liability against Peritus, Heller,
Desmond and Espinosa, the Complaint asserts, first, that "Peritus is believed to be the primary
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shareholder

AMF and is therefore liable for the debts of AME" Id. at <j[ 3. Second, the

Complaint asserts that Peritus, Desmond, Heller and two unnamed individuals -- Tim
Gramatovich and Bob Forgie -- orally agreed to "guarantee payment of Bailey's salary and other
compensation." Id. at <j[ 11. Third, the Complaint asserts that Bailey was employed by all
"Defendants," i.e., AMF, Peritus and even the individual defendants. Id. at <j[ 20; see also id. at
<j[lO (alleging that Bailey was employed by "AMF and Peritus").
In addition to the Breach of Employment Contract cause of action, the Complaint asserts

a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Desmond, Heller and Espinosa,
based on conduct allegedly committed by those members of the AMF Board of Directors. Id. at
<J[<j[

26-31.

2.

The Motion to Dismiss

Peritus and the individual defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Bailey's
claims for failure to state a claim against them. The individual defendants moved to dismiss the
tort claims on grounds that an employee cannot assert intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims arising out of workplace conduct by co-workers. In an attempt to obtain tort damages
against the individual defendants, Bailey abandoned the assertion in his Complaint that he was
employed by AMF and Peritus and asserted unambiguously that "AMF was Bailey's only
employer." See R. 000029-44 (Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss), p.
14; see also id. at p. 13 ("Again, Peritus and Heller were not Bailey's employer").
The District Court dismissed all claims against the individual defendants for failure to
state a claim. See R. 000045-52. Specifically, the District Court dismissed Bailey's claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress because the conduct alleged by Bailey was not
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sufficiently extreme and outrageous to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. The Court also dismissed Bailey's claims that the individual defendants personally
guaranteed Bailey's salary because those claims are barred by the statute of frauds. Id. Bailey
has not challenged that order on appeal. Accordingly, neither the tort claim nor any breach of
contract claims against Desmond, Heller or Espinosa are at issue in this appeal.

3.

AMF Bankruptcy

AMF filed bankruptcy on May 22, 2015. See R. 000004. Peritus lost all of the money it
loaned to AMF -- as did more than 40 other individuals and entities that either loaned money to
AMF (totaling over $15,000,000) or bought AMF Stock. See R. 000103 at 138:5-13.

4.

Peritus' Motion for Summary Judgment

As a result of the motion to dismiss and AMF' s bankruptcy filing, the only remaining
cause of action was Bailey's "Breach of Employment Contract" claim against Peritus. After the
deadline for all discovery to be completed, Peritus moved for summary judgment on that claim
on grounds that Bailey's allegation that Peritus agreed to pay the wages owed by AMF is barred
by the statute of frauds. See R. 000253-276.

5.

Bailey's Motion for Leave to Amend

After the discovery cut-off date, and after Peritus moved for summary judgment, Bailey
moved for leave to amend his Complaint. See R. 000331-359. In that motion, Bailey
acknowledged that his breach of contract claim, as alleged, could not satisfy the statute of frauds.
Id. at 000355. In an attempt to cure that fatal defect, Bailey requested leave to file a proposed

Amended Complaint that attempted to invoke the "original obligation" exception to the statute of
frauds set forth in Idaho Code § 9-506(2). Id. at 000331-346.
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The proposed Amended Complaint still alleges that Peritus is liable for the wages
allegedly owed by AMF (R. 000342 at <J[ 31) and makes just a few substantive changes to the
original Complaint. For example, it deletes the allegation in paragraph 11 of Bailey's original
Complaint that Peritus agreed to "guarantee payment of Bailey's salary and other
compensation." The proposed Amended Complaint replaces that allegation with a contradictory
allegation that Peritus promised to "provide capital to AMF in order to pay the expenses incurred
in the future." Id. at <J[ 13.
The proposed Amended Complaint further clarified Bailey's breach of contract claim
against Peritus and separated that claim into two parts. First, it asserts a claim for "Breach of
Oral Contract" based on Peritus' alleged oral promise to pay Bailey $95,680.70 in back wages
"at such time as AMF became profitable." Id. at <j[<j[ 23-25. However, acknowledging that AMF
filed bankruptcy and never became profitable, Bailey "abandoned" his claim for "Breach of Oral
Contract." Id. at <J[ 27. Second, Bailey asserted a "Breach of Written Agreement Dated August
10, 2011," which is based entirely on the AMF Employment Agreement. Id. at <j[ 28-35.

Specifically, Bailey contends that, in the written AMF Employment Agreement, Peritus agreed
to "provide capital to AMF to pay Bailey's salary and benefits including severance pay." Id. at <j[
31; see also id. at <J[ 13 (alleging that "Peritus was clearly the primary obligor to fund the
development of AMF" because of promises to "provide capital to AMF in order to pay the
expenses incurred in the future"). Bailey then alleges that Peritus breached that written contract
when it "failed to fund AMF with sufficient capital to pay Bailey his twice monthly paychecks."
Id. at <J[ 33.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 10
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6.

The District Court's Orders

On June 14, 2016, the District Court issued an Order Granting Summary Judgment. See
R. 00362-372. In that Order, the District Court held that Bailey's breach of contract claim is
barred by the statute of frauds because the AMF Employment Agreement does not include any
language that makes Peritus liable for Bailey's wages earned as an employee of AMF.

In a separate Order Denying Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, the District
Court denied as futile Bailey's request to file his proposed Amended Complaint. See R. 000373376. That decision was based on two separate grounds. First, a plaintiff cannot amend a
deficient complaint by making new allegations that are "directly contradictory to the original
allegation." Id. at 000375 (quoting Elder v. Idaho-Washington N. R.R., 26 Idaho 209 (1914)).
Second, Bailey's proposed Amended Complaint still did not allege facts that would support a
theory that AMF somehow became Peritus' surety, as required to fit within the exception to the
statute of frauds set forth in Idaho Code § 9-506(2). Id.
The District Court entered judgment in favor of Peritus and awarded costs and attorney
fees to Peritus under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) in the amount of $33,567.74. See R. 000380.

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Peritus is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to

Idaho Appellate Rule 40 and 41and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard
employed by the trial court when deciding such a motion." Stoddart v. Pocatello School Dist.

#25, 149 Idaho 679, 683 (2010). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and
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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id.;
I.R.C.P. 56(c). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over
which this Court exercises free review." See Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho
304, 307 (2007).

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Peritus
The only claim at issue in this appeal is Bailey's breach of contract claim against Peritus,

which is based on an alleged breach of the AMF Employment Agreement. For the reasons set
forth below, the District Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Peritus on that
claim should be affirmed.
1.

Bailey Concedes that Peritus was Never his Employer and did Not Guarantee
Wages Allegedly Owed to Him by AMF

Bailey generally asserts the AMF Employment Agreement contractually obligates Peritus
to pay the wages and severance allegedly earned by Bailey as an employee of AMF.2 However,
Bailey's theories and his factual allegations have changed drastically since filing his Complaint.
First, Bailey's Complaint initially alleged, in very specific terms, that Peritus, Desmond,
Heller, Gramatovich and Forgie all agreed to personally guarantee Bailey's wages during an
April 12, 2007 meeting of the AMF Board of Directors:
On or about April 12, 2007, AMF had a Board of Directors
meeting wherein it was determined by Desmond, Heller, Tim

2
Peritus disputes that AMF owed Bailey the amounts claimed in his Complaint.
Nevertheless, this appeal focuses solely on the legal question of whether Peritus can be held
liable for any debts allegedly owed by AMF.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 12

Gramatovich and Bob Forgie (as Directors of [AMF] and
employees of Peritus) to hire Bailey as the CEO of AMF and to
employ him on a written employment contract wherein they

personally and Peritus would guarantee payment of Bailey's
salary and other compensation.
R. 000012 at <JI 11 (emphasis added).
Bailey has since disavowed that theory. In response to discovery requests, Bailey
admitted that "[t]here was no guarantee from any individual or entity." See R. 000162 (Answer
to Interrogatory No. 12); see also R. 000092-93 (Bailey Depo., 96:4-6; 100:24 - 101:3)
( admitting that Peritus did not promise to guarantee Bailey's wages).
Second, while Bailey's Complaint alleged that he was employed by "AMF and Peritus"
(R. 000012 at <JI 12), he has since admitted in response to Peritus' motion to dismiss that "AMF
was Bailey's only employer." See R. 000042; see also R. 000041 ("Again, Peritus and Heller
were not Bailey's employer").
Third, while Bailey's Complaint alleged that "Peritus is believed to be the primary
shareholder of AMF and is therefore liable for the debts of AMF" (R. 000010 at <JI 3), Bailey
acknowledged during his deposition that Peritus does not own any stock in AMF and never has.

See R. 000088, 000180 (Bailey Depo., 78:2-80:22; Exh. 10). As discussed below, these
admissions significantly impact Bailey's breach of contract claim against Peritus.

2.

Shareholders (Much Less Creditors) are Not Liable for the Alleged Debts of
a Corporation

Bailey's Complaint offers the conclusory assertion that "Peritus is believed to be the
primary shareholder of AMF and is therefore liable for the debts of AMF." See R. 000010 at <JI 3.
As set forth above, however, Peritus simply is not and never has been a shareholder of AMF. At
one point in time, the PGO Fund -- a now dissolved legal entity -- was AMF's largest
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shareholder. However, that legal entity dissolved and all shares went to the limited partners of
the PGO Fund individually. Peritus does not own any shares in AMF and never has. See R.
000180. Peritus is merely one of many creditors that has loaned money to AMF. Id.
Even if Peritus was a shareholder of AMF, shareholders of a corporation are not liable for
the debts of corporation. Absent piercing of the corporate veil, which has never been alleged,
"the stockholders of a corporation are not personally liable for corporate obligations." Davidson
v. Beco C017J., 112 Idaho 560, 568-569 (Ct. App. 1986), partially overruled on other grounds,

114 Idaho 107 (1987). In any event, Bailey does not appear to assert on appeal that Peritus' is
liable to Bailey because of any alleged status as a shareholder.

3.

Only Employers are Liable for an Employee's \Vages

Neither shareholders nor entities that loan funds to a corporation are liable for an
employee's wages. Rather, only employers are liable for an employee's wages. See I.C. §45608 ("Employers shall pay all wages due to their employees .... "). As one court has explained:
The duty to pay wages is an obligation that can only arise from the
employer-employee relationship .... Plaintiffs here were employed
by Kline. Aquatic had no control over the manner in which the
diving operations were conducted. It is clear that plaintiffs were
not employees of Aquatic. There being no employer-employee
relationship, Aquatic cannot owe them wages.
Jernigan v. Lay Barge Delta Five, 296 F. Supp. 127, 128-29 (S.D. Tex. 1969).

Bailey's Complaint alleges that he was employed by both "AMF and Peritus." However,
Bailey disavowed that theory in an attempt to obtain tort damages against the individual
defendants, and Bailey has since admitted that "AMF was Bailey's only employer." See R.
000042. Given the undisputed fact that AMF was Bailey's only employer, AMF alone is legally
responsible for Bailey's wages absent some form of guarantee.
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4.

Bailey Has Conceded that Peritus did Not Guarantee His Wages

Even though Bailey's Complaint specifically alleged that Peritus guaranteed his wages,
he has since disavowed that theory and admitted that "[t]here was no guarantee from any
individual or entity." See R. 000162. While now disavowing any guarantee, Bailey still asserts
that Peritus is somehow obligated to pay wages allegedly owed to him by AMF. See Appellant's
Brief, p. 19 ("Peritus made a promise to answer for the obligation of AMF"). That claim is
based entirely on the AMF Employment Agreement. Id.; see also R. 000341-343 (proposed
Amended Complaint,<[~! 28-35). No matter how Bailey characterizes the alleged promise by
Peritus to pay his wages earned as an employee of AMF -- i.e., a "guarantee," a "surety," or
some other label

such a claim falls squarely within the statute of frauds.

The statute of frauds requires that any alleged promise to pay the debt of another be in
writing to be enforceable. Specifically, the statute of frauds provides:

In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or
some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed
by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary
evidence of its contents:

2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another, except in the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho
Code.
LC. § 9-505(2).
While no longer using the term "guarantee," Bailey's allegation that Peritus promised to
pay wages Bailey earned as an employee of AMF still falls squarely within the statute of frauds
as a "promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another." Id. An alleged contract
that falls within the statute of frauds "is unenforceable if there is not a sufficient writing to
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comply with the statute of frauds.

Mickelsen Construction, Inc. v. Horrocks,

Idaho 396,

401 (2013). "In order to render an oral contract falling within the scope of the statute of frauds
enforceable by action, the memorandum thereof must state the contract with such certainty that

its essentials can be known from the memorandum itself, or by a reference contained in it to
some other writing, without recourse to parol proof to supply them." Id. at 402 (emphasis
added). "The memorandum which evidences the verbal agreement must contain all the terms

of that agreement." Id. (emphasis added). "Otherwise, it cannot be enforced at law or in
equity." Id.
As explained in Mickelsen, an alleged promise to pay the obligations of another must be
contained in a written memorandum that (1) evidences an "intent by [a defendant] to be liable for
the obligation of some other person or entity," (2) "name[s] or identif[ies] the person or entity
that is primarily liable"; and (3) "specif[ies] what obligation of that person or entity is allegedly
being guaranteed." Id. at 402 (concluding that a signed document did not satisfy the statute of
frauds because it failed to meet these requirements).
The AMF Employment Agreement does not satisfy any of these requirements. Just like
the insufficient written document in Mickelsen, the AMF Employment Agreement "does not
show any intent by either of the Defendants to be liable for the obligation of some other person
or entity." Id. at 402. It "does not name or identify the person or entity that is primarily liable,
and it does not specify what obligation of that person or entity is allegedly being guaranteed."
Id. And, "[t]here is nothing on the [AMF Employment Agreement] indicating that [Peritus]

agreed to guaranty any obligation of [AMF] to [Bailey]." Id.
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Regardless of how it is now characterized by Bailey, the AMF Employment Agreement
simply does not state that Peritus will pay the wages Bailey allegedly owed to him by AMF. In
fact, the body of the AMF Employment Agreement does not make a single reference to Peritus.
Instead, it refers only to AMF. The very first line of the agreement states that it is "a letter of
Employment with American Medical File, Inc. (OnFile)." See R. 000019. It then goes on to
describe Bailey's obligations to AMF, including his role as a "member of the Board of Directors
of American Medical File to which you and [the CEO] will provide regular reports." Id.
The most basic provision of the agreement alleged by Bailey -- that Peritus would pay the
wages Bailey earned during his employment with AMF -- is nowhere to be found. Indeed,
Bailey admitted in his deposition that there was no such agreement:
Q. Does this contract say who was going to pay your salary?
A. I think it talks about who I work for. It's a letter of
employment from American Medical File, but I don't see -- I don't
remember any agreement on who was going to pay ....

See R. 000098 (Bailey Depo., 119: 16-21).
The AMF Employment Agreement simply does not satisfy the statute of frauds.3 In fact,
Bailey does not contend that the AMF Employment Agreement satisfies the statute of frauds.

3

The Court may not look to parole evidence to support Bailey's claim that Peritus
promised to pay his wages. See Mickelsen, 154 Idaho at 402 (to satisfy the statute of frauds, "the
memorandum thereof must state the contract with such certainty that its essentials can be known
from the memorandum itself, or by a reference contained in it to some other writing, without
recourse to parol proof to supply them"). Even if the Court were to look beyond the four corners
of the AMF Employment Agreement, Bailey's conduct unambiguously corroborates the fact that
Peritus never agreed to pay his wages. Shortly after walking out on AMF, Bailey sent two
demand letters (from two experienced lawyers) addressed only to AMF, asserting that
"American Medical File, Inc." owed Bailey wages and severance. See Bailey Depo., Exhs. 1920. Neither letter makes any mention of Peritus even though Bailey knew AMF was over
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Instead, he argues that the statute of frauds does not apply to the AMF Employment Agreement
because that agreement creates an "original obligation" under Idaho Code § 9-506(2).

5.

The District Court Correctly Rejected Bailey's New "Original Obligation"
Theory

In response to Peritus' motion for summary judgment, Bailey disavowed the guarantee
theory pled in his Complaint. Instead, he asserted for the first time that Peritus' alleged promise
to pay the wages Bailey earned as an employee of AMF falls within the "original obligation"
exception to the statute of frauds as provided for in Idaho Code § 9-506(2). The District Court
correctly rejected that argument for multiple reasons.

a)

Bailey Cannot Rely on the Original Obligation Exception Because He
Alleges that AMF Remained Liable for His Wages

Although now avoiding any "guarantee" terminology, Bailey still asserts that "Peritus
made a promise to answer for the obligation of AMF." See Appellant's Brief, p. 19. As set forth
in Idaho Code§ 9-505(2), such a "promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another" must be contained in a written document that satisfies the statute of frauds "except in
the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code."
Idaho Code § 9-506(2) creates a narrow exception to the statute of frauds that applies
only"[ w ]here the creditor parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in consideration of the
obligations in respect to which the promise is made, in terms or under circumstances such as to
render the party making the promise the principal debtor, and the person in whose behalf it is
made, his surety." Bailey's new reliance on Idaho Code§ 9-506(2) must be rejected as a matter
of law for the reasons explained by the Idaho Supreme Court just a few years ago in Mickelsen

$15,000,000 in debt.
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Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396 (201

That case raised issues, arguments and a

procedural posture almost identical to those presented here.
In Mickelsen, Accelerated Paving owed Mickelsen $34,980. Mickelsen filed a lawsuit
against Sunshine Secretarial Services and Lesa Horrock, individually, alleging specifically that
they agreed to "guarantee" Accelerated Paving's obligation to Mickelsen. When confronted with
a statute of frauds defense, Mickelsen asserted that alleged promise to pay Accelerated Paving's
obligation was an "original obligation" under Idaho Code § 9-506(2). In granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, the Court first noted that Mickelsen had not pled an
"original obligation" claim under Idaho Code § 9-506(2), but instead pled a personal guarantee
theory. See id. at 405 ("Because the complaint in the instant case only alleged a guaranty, it did
not allege a claim under Idaho Code Section 9-506(2) .... [T]he only issues considered on
summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings.").
Mickelsen's allegation of a personal guarantee precluded him from relying on the
"original obligation" exception in Idaho Code§ 9-506(2) because "[a]n allegation of an
agreement to guaranty a debt and an allegation of an agreement under section 9-506(2) are
mutually exclusive." Id. at 404. To be excepted from the statute of frauds under section 9506(2), a defendant "would have had to agree to become 'the principal debtor.'" Id. "One
cannot be both the principal debtor who has defaulted and the guarantor who is secondarily liable
in the event of such default." Id.
In rejecting Mickelsen' s claim of an "original obligation" under Idaho Code § 9-506(2),
the Court explained that its decision was not based just on a pleading technicality. Rather, the
defendants could not be "original obligors" or "principal debtors" because Mickelsen had alleged
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that Accelerated Paving was still liable for the original obligation, in addition to Sunshine
Secretariai Services and Lesa Horrock. Id. at 405 ("[i]f under the alieged agreement the creditor
contended that the original debtors were still liable, then the defendants could not have become
the principal debtors, which was necessary for section 9-506(2) to apply."); see also Storer v.
Heitfeld, 19 Idaho 170 (1910) (if a plaintiff contends that the initial debtor is still "in any degree

liable for the indebtedness," the defendant cannot be considered an original obligor); Magee v.
Winn, 52 Idaho 553 ( 1932) (a defendant cannot be an original obligor "if plaintiff held

defendant's sister still responsible to him," and under such circumstances an alleged promise by
the defendant to answer for his sister's obligation is governed by the statute of frauds).
The District Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Peritus for the
reasons set forth in Mickelsen. First, Bailey's Complaint specifically alleges that Peritus agreed
to "guarantee" wages owed by AMF, making it impossible for Peritus to also be the principal
debtor. See R. 000012 at<[ 11. Second, and more importantly, Peritus cannot be the "principal
debtor" because Bailey affirmatively alleges that AMF remained obligated to pay the wages he
earned as an employee of AMF. See R. 000284 (Bailey's Brief in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment, acknowledging: "It is true that AMF was Bailey's employer and was
obligated to pay Bailey."). Bailey's paychecks came from AMF, not Peritus. See R. 000214.
Indeed, Bailey sent AMF two demand letters shortly after the termination of his employment
alleging that AMF owed him unpaid wages and severance, without so much as mentioning
Peritus (R. 000215-220) and later suit against AMF to collect the obligation he now contends is
owed by Peritus. See R. 000009.
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The Court's analysis should stop here because Bailey's argument under Idaho Code§
906(2) is foreclosed as a matter of law under Mickelsen. However, summary judgment can be
affirmed for the additional reasons as set forth below.

b)

The AMF Employment Agreement does Not Support Bailey's New
"Original Obligation" Theory

Bailey dedicates much of his brief to explaining the purported differences between a
surety agreement and a guarantee agreement. He relies on Idaho Code § 9-506(2) to proclaim
that "a surety contract, by statute, need not be in writing." See Appellant's Brief, p. 24. That
assertion is simply incorrect. This case does not tum on some technical distinction between a
"surety" and a "guarantee" agreement. In fact, those terms are often used interchangeably by
Idaho courts to refer to any third party who has agreed to answer the debt of another. See, e.g.,
McGill v. Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 494,497 (1981) (noting that "the words guarantor
and surety" are often used interchangeably).
Surety agreements, just like other types of guarantees fall squarely within the statute of
frauds and must be in writing to be enforceable. As explained in Corpus Juris Secundum:
As a general rule, under the statute of frauds, any special promise
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, in order
to create a legal obligation, must be in writing or evidenced by a
sufficient note or memorandum, and signed by the promisor or
some other person lawfully authorized by the promisor. This
provision of statute of frauds is commonly referred to as the
"suretyship provision" or "surety provision." The provision
requires written evidence when one person promises to pay the
debt of another, because there is a temptation for a promisee, in a
case where the real debtor has proved insolvent or unable to pay, to
enlarge the scope of the promise, or to torture mere words of
encouragement and confidence into an absolute promise.
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C.J.S. Statute of Frauds§ 8 (2016); see also Emerson v. Slater, 63 U.S. 28, 31

(1859)

("And, inasmuch as the contract declared on is that of a surety, it must be in writing, and wholly
in writing [under the statute of frauds]."); Storer, 19 Idaho 170, 113 P. 80, 81 (1910)
(recognizing that an alleged contract under which defendants become either "guarantors or
sureties" must comply with the statute of frauds).
Idaho Code § 9-506(2) does not except all surety agreements from the statute of frauds.
To the contrary, Idaho Code § 9-506(2) creates a narrow exception to the statute of frauds that
applies only "under circumstances such as to render the party making the promise the principal
debtor and the person in whose behalf it is made, his surety." As explained in Mickelsen, the
narrow exception to the statute of frauds applies only where there is a "promise made by a third
party [i.e., Peritus] which, by its terms or under the circumstances, makes the third party [Peritus]
the principal debtor and the original debtor [AMF] the third party's [Peritus] surety." Mickelsen,
154 Idaho at 402. Thus, to fit within the exception, Bailey must establish that Peritus stepped
into AMF' s shoes and agreed to pay Bailey's salary as the principal debtor and that AMF agreed
to act as Peritus' surety, i.e., that AMF would pay Bailey only if Peritus failed to do so. Idaho
Code § 9-506(2) is inapplicable because Bailey does not contend that AMF agreed to act as
Peritus' surety. Instead, he contends that Peritus agreed to act as a surety. See Appellants' Brief,
p. 17 ("Therefore, Peritus persuaded Bailey to continue working at AMF by acting as a surety in
the transaction.").
Moreover, Bailey's proposed Amended Complaint is inconsistent with an "original
obligation" theory. Bailey's proposed Amended Complaint does not allege that Peritus promised
to pay Bailey's wages as the principal debtor and that AMF agreed to act as Peritus' surety in the
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event that Peritus failed to pay Bailey's wages. To the contrary, it alleges that Peritus promised
to "provide capital to AMF to pay Bailey's salary and benefits including severance pay." See R.
000334-347 at <j[ 31; see also id. at <j[ 13 (alleging that "Peritus was clearly the primary obligor to
fund the development of AMF" because of promises to "provide capital to AMF in order to pay
the expenses incurred in the future"). Bailey then alleges that Peritus breached those promises
when it "failed to fund AMF with sufficient capital to pay Bailey his twice monthly paychecks."
Id. at <J[ 33.
Nor do the undisputed facts support a theory that Peritus agreed to pay Bailey's wages as
the principal debtor and that AMF agreed to act as Peritus' surety in the event that Peritus failed
to pay Bailey's wages. It is undisputed that all wages paid to Bailey -- both before and after
execution of the AMF Employment Agreement

came in the form of a check from AMF and

that Peritus never paid a single dollar of Bailey's wages. See R. 000090 (Bailey Depo. at 89: 1118). Then, after suddenly quitting his job, Bailey sent demand letters to AMF without so much
as mentioning Peritus. See R. 000215-220. Thus, neither Bailey, nor AMF, nor Peritus acted as
if Peritus was the primary debtor responsible for paying Bailey's wages.
Most importantly, the AMF Employment Agreement -- the document on which Bailey
exclusively relies -- simply does not establish a surety relationship or otherwise provide that
Peritus will pay Bailey's wages. See R. 000019-20. The AMF Employment Agreement says
nothing about Peritus agreeing to pay Bailey's wages as a primary debtor or AMF agreeing to act
as Peritus' surety if Peritus failed to pay the wages. In fact, the body of the AMF Employment
Agreement does not make a single reference to Peritus. Instead, it refers only to AMF, states that
it is "a letter of Employment with American Medical File, Inc. (OnFile)," and then describes
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Bailey's responsibilities as an AMF employee. Id. The most basic provision of Bailey's
"original obligation" theory -- that Peritus would pay the wages Bailey earned during his
employment with AMF -- is nowhere to be found. Indeed, Bailey admitted in his deposition that
the AMF Employment Agreement says no such thing:
Q. Does this contract say who was going to pay your salary?
A. I think it talks about who I work for. It's a letter of
employment from American Medical File, but I don't see -- I don't
remember any agreement on who was going to pay ....

See R. 000098 (Bailey Depo., 119:16-21).
Given that the AMF Employment Agreement contains no language obligating Peritus to
pay the wages Bailey earned as an AMF Employee, it does not satisfy the exception set forth in
Idaho Code § 9-506(2) or otherwise create an "original obligation." See Indus. Inv. Corp. v.

Rocca, 100 Idaho 228, 233 (1979) ("A guarantor, like a surety, has been held to be a favorite of
the law and his liability is not to be extended by implication beyond the express limits or terms
of the instrument, or its plain intent."); Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams,
107 Idaho 890, 894 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (a promise to pay the debts of another "must be
strictly construed and not extended beyond the express limits of the instruments creating them").
Rather than rely on any language in the AMF Employment Agreement, Bailey seems to
claim that Peritus is liable for his AMF wages because the signature lines of two of the three
individuals signing the AMF Employment Agreement on behalf of AMF referenced both their
AMF and their Peritus titles. At the time of the AMF Employment Agreement, there were four
individuals on AMF's Board of Directors -- Bailey, Heller, Desmond and Espinosa. Bailey
could not sign his own employment agreement, so it was signed by the other three members of
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AMF Board of Directors. Each signature line references the signor's title as a member of the
AMF Board of Director. Heller and Desmond's signature lines note that they also serve as
directors of Peritus. See R. 000019-20.
Courts around the country have recognized that a mere signature on a contract does not
create contractual liability when that signatory is not mentioned in the body of the contract.
"The general rule supported by the courts is substantially to the effect that when the body of a
contract purports to set out the names of the parties thereto and a person not named in the body
of the contract signs the contract, and there is nothing in the contract to indicate that such person
signed as a party, such person is not bound by the contract and hence is not liable thereunder."
Viacom Outdoor, Inc. v. Taouil, 254 S.W.3d 234, 239-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (entering
judgment in favor of a defendant because "the Agreement sets out the names of the parties in the
body of the contract and [defendant]' s name does not appear" and "there is no language in the
Agreement obligating [defendant]").
Again, the body of the AMF Employment Agreement makes no reference whatsoever to
Peritus, much less an express promise on Peritus' part to pay the wages Bailey earned as an AMF
employee. Accordingly, Bailey cannot rely upon the AMF Employment Agreement to argue that
Peritus is liable for wages allegedly owed to him by AMF.

c)

Bailey's Reliance on the "Main Purpose Rule" is Equally Unavailing

Bailey next relies on the "main purpose rule" to argue that Peritus' alleged promise to
pay wages owed by AMF falls outside of the statute of frauds. As explained in Treasure Valley
Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Earth Res. Co., 115 Idaho 373,378 (Ct. App. 1988), the "main
purpose rule" is just another way of saying that under certain circumstances an oral promise may

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 25
44378.0004 8535741. l

be considered an "original obligation" because it is "original or independent from, and not
merely collateral to, the agreement between the promisee and the third-party debtor."4
In that case, Treasure Valley Plumbing had a contract with Mountain States Mineral
Enterprises to install plumbing and a water supply system at a mine owned by Earth Resources.
When Mountain States failed to pay Treasure Valley Plumbing, Treasure Valley Plumbing filed
a mechanics lien on Earth Resources' property. Earth Resources later made promises to pay
Treasure Valley Plumbing to perform additional work involving repairs and removal of pipe
damaged after installation. Id. at 378. After refusing to pay for that additional work, Earth
Resources relied on the statute of frauds to defend its non-payment. Not surprisingly, the Court
of Appeals found that Earth Resources' promise was a new and original obligation supported by
new consideration. Specifically, Earth Resources agreed to pay Treasure Valley Plumbing to redo work on a damaged stretch of pipe, which Treasure Valley was "not obligated to [do] under
its original agreement" with Mountain States. Id. at 379. Earth Resources' promise to pay
Treasure Valley Plumbing for new work was an original obligation because it was "separate and
apart from the original agreement between Mountain States and Treasure Valley," which
agreement "had been fully performed." Id.
Treasure Valley Plumbing is easily distinguishable from the facts presented here. Bailey

does not allege that Peritus made a promise "separate and apart from the original agreement"
between Bailey and AMF, nor does he allege that the original agreement between Bailey and

4
The Idaho Supreme Court has never addressed, much less adopted, the so-called "main
purpose rule." It appears that Treasure Valley Plumbing, a Court of Appeals case, is the only
reported Idaho decision addressing the concept.
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AMF "had been fully performed." Instead, Bailey simply alleges that "Peritus made a promise
to answer for the obligation of AMF" -- i.e., to pay wages allegedly owed by Peritus. See
Appellants' Brief, p. 19. Thus, the alleged promise is not an original promise, but rather an
alleged promise to answer for the debt of another, which falls squarely within the statute of
frauds. Moreover, under Mickelsen, Peritus cannot be considered an "original promisor" because
Bailey affirmatively alleges that AMF remained liable for Bailey's wages and severance.
The so-called "main purpose rule" has no application in this case. Unlike all of the outof-state authorities he cites, Bailey's reliance on that theory is not based on an alleged oral
promise that Peritus would pay wages owed to Bailey by AMF. Bailey specifically deleted those
allegations in his proposed Amended Complaint and affirmatively "abandoned" any claim based
on an alleged breach of an oral contract. See R. 000341 at <j[ 27. Instead, Bailey's claim, which
he now calls a "Breach of Written Agreement Dated August 10, 2011," is based exclusively on
the written AMF Employment Agreement. Id. at <j[<j[ 28-35. Again, the written document simply
does not state that Peritus would pay Bailey's wages as an employee of AMF.
Bailey's repeated changes to his theory show that he is grasping at straws. No matter
how phrased -- as a guarantee agreement, surety agreement, original obligation or a written
promise under the so-called "main purpose rule" -- the AMF Employment Agreement simply
does not state that Peritus is obligated to pay Bailey's wages. As Bailey admitted in his
deposition, the AMF Employment Agreement makes no mention whatsoever of any obligation
on the part of Peritus. See R. 000098 (Bailey Depo., 119: 16-21). Indeed, even Bailey's
proposed Amended Complaint does not so allege. Instead, it alleges that "Peritus agreed to be
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primary obligor to provide capital to AMF to pay Bailey's salary" -- which, of course, the
AMF Employment Agreement also does not say.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the District Court's order granting summary
judgment should be affirmed.

6.

The District Court Correctly Denied Bailey's Motion for Leave to Amend his
Complaint

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party may amend its complaint after a
responsive pleading has been filed only with leave of the Court. Although leave to amend is
generally granted liberally, a court may deny leave to amend for reasons such as undue delay,
undue prejudice, and futility of amendment. Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen,
133 Idaho 866, 871 ( 1999). On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reviews the District Court's
denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.,
156 Idaho 749, 753 (2014).
Here, Bailey filed his Complaint against his former employer, AMF, and Peritus on
October 30, 2014. The Complaint alleges that AMF breached the AMF Employment Agreement
by failing to pay Bailey certain wages and that Peritus breached an oral agreement to "guarantee
payment of Bailey's salary and other compensation." See R. 000012 at~[ 11.
AMF and Peritus filed answers to the Complaint, asserting that Bailey's claims were
barred by the statute of frauds. See R. 000026. Peritus also filed a motion to dismiss under
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, relying in part on the statute of frauds. Bailey did
not seek leave to amend his Complaint or otherwise raise Idaho Code § 9-506(2) at that time.
Instead, he argued that the AMF Employment Agreement is a written "memorandum" that
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satisfies the statute of frauds

that the statute of frauds should not be addressed on a motion to

dismiss. See R. 000029-43.
Bailey sought to amend his Complaint on May 11, 2016, only after Peritus filed a motion
for summary judgment and almost four months after the January 21, 2016, deadline for
amending pleadings. The proposed Amended Complaint deleted Bailey's allegation that Peritus
agreed to "guarantee payment of Bailey's salary and other compensation," and replaces that
allegation with a contradictory allegation that Peritus agreed to "provide capital to AMF to pay
Bailey's salary and benefits including severance pay." See R. 000342 at <J[ 31. Bailey further
alleges that Peritus breached the AMF Employment Agreement when it "failed to fund AMF
with sufficient capital to pay Bailey his twice monthly paychecks." Id. at <J[ 33.
The District Court correctly denied Bailey's motion to amend for two reasons. First, the
proposed Amended Complaint is futile. To fix the fatal flaw in Bailey's case -- failure to satisfy
the statute of frauds -- Bailey would have to point to a written contract satisfying the statute of
frauds. He cannot because the AMF Employment Agreement simply does not provide that
Peritus would pay the wages Bailey earned as an AMF employee. Alternatively, Bailey would
have to establish, under Idaho Code§ 9-506(2), that Peritus stepped into AMF's shoes and
agreed to pay Bailey's salary as the principal debtor and AMF agreed to act as a surety if Peritus
failed to do so. As explained above, Bailey's proposed Amended Complaint does not allege any
such facts. Instead, it alleges that Peritus agreed to "provide capital to AMF to pay Bailey's
salary and benefits including severance pay." Id. at CJ[ 31. Even if the proposed Amended
Complaint contained language that might fit within the exception, the amendment would still be
futile because Bailey alleges that AMF continued to be liable for his wages. See Mickelsen, 154
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Idaho at 405 ("[i]f under the alleged agreement the creditor contended that the original debtors
were still liable, then the defendants could not have become the principal debtors, which was
necessary for section 9-506(2) to apply."). As the District Court concluded, "Because Plaintiff's
proposed Amended Complaint does not include language that would compel a different result on
summary judgment, Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint is futile." See R. 000375.
Second, Bailey's original Complaint alleges that Peritus guaranteed Bailey's wages in the
event that AMF did not pay those wages. See R. 000012 at <Jl 11. In order to create the
relationship that would take the AMF Employment Agreement out of the statute of frauds under
Idaho Code§ 9-506(2), Peritus would have to agree to pay Bailey's salary as the principal debtor
and AMF would have to agree to pay Bailey if Peritus failed to do so -- the exact opposite of
what Bailey's original Complaint alleged. As the District Court correctly concluded, Bailey may
not amend his complaint to assert such contradictory allegations. See Elder v. Idaho-Washington
N. R. R., 26 Idaho 209 ( 1914) (affirming denial of a motion to amend that would be "directly

contradictory to the original allegation"); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296-97 (9th
Cir. 1990) (leave to amend may be granted to allege "other facts consistent with the challenged
pleading," but not where the proposed amendment "contradict[s] any of the allegations of his
original complaint").
Finally, Bailey asks the Court to "reconsider the intent of 'notice pleading."' See
Appellant's Brief, p. 13. However, the District Court did not dismiss Bailey's claim against
Peritus for failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. Instead, the District Court correctly
granted summary judgment because Bailey cannot point to a written agreement that satisfies the
statute of frauds and because Bailey's own Complaint (including allegations that AMF remains
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liable for Bailey's wages) makes the original obligation exception to the statute

frauds

inapplicable as a matter of law.
B.

Peritus Is Entitled To An Award Of Attorneys' Fees On Appeal
The District Court entered judgment in favor of Peritus and awarded costs and attorney

fees to Peritus under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) in the amount of $33,567.74. See R. 000380.
Bailey does not challenge that order on appeal. Peritus is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees
on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41 and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) for the same reason it was
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees at the district court level.
Bailey acknowledges that "this is a commercial transaction" and that "[t]he prevailing
party shall be entitled to an award of attorney fees per I.C. § 12-120(3)." See Appellant's Brief,
p. 9. Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) requires an award of attorneys' fees to "the prevailing party in a
civil action involving a commercial transaction .... " Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182,

I 87, 75 P.3d 743, 748 (2003).
Bailey's Complaint alleged that Peritus breached the AMF Employment Agreement.
"Actions brought for breach of an employment contract are considered commercial transactions,
subject to the attorney fee provision of I.C. § 12-120(3)." Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co.,
145 Idaho 408,415 (2008). Further, "[w]here an action is one to recover in a commercial
transaction, that claim triggers the application of Section 12-120(3) and the prevailing party may
recover fees 'regardless of the proof that the commercial transaction did in fact occur."' Id.; see
also O'Connor v. Harger Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904 (2008) (prevailing defendant entitled to
attorney fees upon establishing that alleged contract did not exist). Accordingly, the conclusion
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that Bailey's breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of frauds entitles Peritus to an
award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).

V. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Peritus respectfully asks the Court to affirm summary judgment
in favor of Peritus and to award Peritus attorney fees on appeal.

DATED THIS 28th day of December, 2016.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By~

Attorney for Petitioner
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